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The new Simplified Superannuation regulations for Australian superannuation provide tax 
concessions to retirement income streams which comply with legislated minimum 
drawdown rules. We evaluate these new drawdown rules against four alternatives, 
including three formula-based ‘rules of thumb’ and the previous legislated minimum 
drawdown limits for allocated pensions. We find that the new regulations are a substantial 
improvement on the previous rules for allocated pensions and, when compared with the 
four formula-based rules, are a good compromise in terms of simplicity, adequacy and risk. 
We also find that welfare is lower for most individuals who follow the Simplified 
Superannuation compared with welfare under an optimal path or a simple fixed percentage 
drawdown rule, but that outcomes could be improved through a further simplification of 
the rules.  
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19-20 2007) for useful comments. Financial support from the ARC is gratefully 
acknowledged.  1. Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed substantial changes to retirement savings policies and 
products around the world, as policy makers and the wealth management industry have 
attempted to address the retirement needs of ageing populations. Retirement income 
reforms in Australia, in the form of the Superannuation Guarantee and incentives to make 
voluntary contributions, have resulted in a huge increase in the coverage of superannuation, 
from less than 50 per cent of employees in the mid 1980s to close to 100 per cent of full 
time employees by 2006. However, despite the imminent retirement of the first of the baby 
boomers, far less attention has been paid to policy and product development to enable an 
orderly drawdown of savings in retirement than to enabling accumulation.
1
In Australia, in the absence of compulsion, successive governments have attempted to 
encourage the take-up of retirement income streams through incentives in the tax system 
and concessions under the Age Pension means tests. While these incentives and 
concessions have been continually modified over the past twenty years or so, they appear to 
have done little to address Australian retirees’ preference for lump sum benefits.  
The Simplified Superannuation measures introduced in the 2006/07 Federal Budget
2 have 
changed the constraints and concessions for Australian superannuants yet again. In 
particular, once the measures are fully implemented, retirees aged 60 and over will be 
exempt from tax on all retirement benefits – whether taken as a lump sum or an income 
                                         
1 This is despite a growing literature on annuities and retirement payments. See for example Mitchell et al 
(1999), Brown (2001), Doyle et al (2002), Davidoff et al (2005), Dus et al (2005), Kingston and Thorp 
(2005), Horneff et al (2007) and Mitchell et al (2006).   
2 Subsequently marketed to the Australian public as Better Superannuation. 
  1stream – and all retirement income streams will be subject to the same Age Pension income 
and assets tests, irrespective of income stream type. As well, where the drawn down pattern 
complies with a legislated schedule of minimum percentages of account balance, earnings 
on the underlying assets also will be free of tax. These new income streams are called 
‘account-based pensions’ and the revised drawdown schedule replaces the previous 
minimum and maximum drawdown limits for allocated pensions. The new rules appear to 
be designed to discourage retirees from using tax-concessional retirement savings for 
storing up bequests, while at the same time giving some guidance on a prudent spending 
plan (Bateman and Kingston 2007). 
Economic theory
3 has long held that optimal drawdown plans in retirement will differ 
according to the preferences of each individual and the risks they face, while the financial 
planning industry has frequently proposed simple ‘rules of thumb’ as approximations to 
more complicated dynamic plans. In this study we investigate the benefits and risks of the 
new minimum drawdown requirements under Simplified Superannuation and compare 
them with outcomes under the previous legislated limits for allocated pensions and a range 
of simple ‘rules of thumb’, as well as theoretically optimal paths. We do this for retirees 
holding their retirement savings in typical investment plans, matching the most common 
offerings of allocated pension and superannuation investments, and accounting for 
longevity patterns drawn from the latest Australian Life Table projections.  
We find that following the legislated minimum drawdown plan under Simplified 
Superannuation means lower welfare for most individuals when compared with following 
                                         
3 See the seminal paper by Merton (1971), and Campbell and Viceira (2002) for a more recent survey. 
  2an optimal path or a simple fixed percentage drawdown rule. We also show that the 
regulations are a binding constraint on optimal drawdown plans, but the reductions in 
welfare when compared with the unconstrained plans are fairly small. Overall the new 
Simplified Superannuation regulations offer a substantial improvement over the previous 
allocated pension minimum valuation factors and are a good compromise in terms of 
simplicity, adequacy and risk. We conclude that welfare could be further improved with a 
minor simplification of the new drawdown rules. 
We begin with a survey of retirement income stream products and policies in Australia. We 
then evaluate the new minimum drawdown requirements for account-based pensions under 
Simplified Superannuation against possible alternatives, using the criteria of simplicity, 
adequacy, risk and consumer welfare. We conclude by exploring ways to further improve 
the new rules and highlight avenues for future research.   
2. Retirement income products and policies in Australia 
The policy framework for retirement income streams in Australia has been evolving since 
the decision in the late 1970s to concentrate on encouraging (and later mandating) privately 
managed saving for retirement, rather than introduce the then popular OECD style system 
of earnings-related public pensions (Bateman, Kingston and Piggott 2001). However, the 
decision to mandate retirement saving did not include (and has not subsequently included) 
mandatory retirement incomes. Instead, retirement income policy (as opposed to retirement 
saving policy) has been the subject of a succession of reforms and changes as attempts have 
been made to encourage the voluntary take-up of income streams with particular features. 
These reforms commenced in the 1980s with the decision to exempt from tax the earnings 
  3of assets underlying certain types of annuities and have evolved since then to include tax 
and Age Pension means test concessions for a wide range of income streams. The most 
recent changes are the Simplified Superannuation reforms, announced in the 2006 
Commonwealth Budget and implemented throughout 2007, which were introduced with the 
stated aim of simplifying retirement income stream policies and products (Australian 
Treasury 2006a, 2006b). 
An important initiative in the 1990s was the introduction of a statutory framework for a 
phased withdrawal product – called an allocated pension.
4 As compared to an annuity, the 
purchaser retiree retains ownership of the capital sum, is able to choose the underlying 
asset allocation and has some discretion over the drawdown pattern. Under the pre-Budget-
2006 rules, drawings from allocated pensions had to be made at least annually and were 
subject to legislated minimum and maximum limits (which differed by the age of the 
account holder).
5
At the time of the 2006 Budget, the regulatory framework recognized four types of 
retirement income streams: lifetime annuities, term certain annuities, allocated pensions 
(and annuities), and a hybrid product (introduced in 2004), called a term allocated pension 
(TAP) or market linked income stream.
6 These alternative products provide different 
benefits to Australian retirees. Lifetime annuities insure against longevity risk and 
investment risk and can be designed to address inflation risk. However, pricing issues and 
conservative asset allocations may compromise adequacy. Life expectancy term annuities 
                                         
4 An allocated pension is periodic drawdown from a retirement accumulation. 
5 The maximum payments were designed to exhaust the account balance by age 80, while the minimum 
payments were designed to last until past 100 years of age. 
6 See Thorp, Kingston and Bateman (2007) for a description of the product features. 
  4have similar attributes, with the exception of longevity risk, while allocated pensions and 
TAPs have the possibility of higher expected returns, but leave retirees exposed to 
investment risk and longevity risk.   
The pre-Budget-2006 approach provided, through the tax system and under the Age 
Pension means tests, the strongest incentives to purchase lifetime annuities, life expectancy 
term annuities and TAPs. The centerpiece was a 50 per cent exemption from the Age 
Pension assets test (which itself had been reduced from a 100 per cent exemption in 2004), 
and, in addition, income streams defined as ‘complying annuities’ were free of tax on the 
earnings of underlying assets. Further, retirees who took certain types of income streams 
were eligible for a higher pension retirement benefit limit (RBL) and a 15 per cent annuity 
rebate.
7
The tax and Age Pension means tests treatment of each of these retirement income types, 
before and after the implementation of Simplified Superannuation, are summarized in 
Table 1. 
<insert Table 1 about here>  
Despite these incentives, the overwhelming preference of those Australian retirees who 
take income streams rather than lump sums at retirement, has been to purchase allocated 
pensions
8 or account-based pensions as they are now known. The market share for the four 
types of retirement income streams over the period 1999 to 2006 is illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                         
7 In 2006/07 the pension RBL was $1,356,291, or twice the lump sum RBL of $678,149. 
8  Allocated pension is defined to include allocated annuities. 
  5<insert Figure 1 about here> 
In the September quarter 2006, allocated pensions accounted for 87.6 per cent of the 
market for retirement income streams (by dollar amount sales). The remainder comprised 
9.7 per cent for term annuities, 2.6 per cent for TAPs and less than 0.2 per cent for life 
annuities.  
Figure 1 clearly illustrates the impact of changes to the tax rules, Age Pension means tests 
and regulatory environment on the take-up of the different types of income streams. For 
example, the announcement in the May 2004 Budget of a plan to reduce the assets test 
preference for lifetime and life expectancy annuities (from a 100 per cent to a 50 per cent 
exemption) from 20 September of that year saw an increase in sales of these products in the 
September quarter 2004, followed by a significant fall in subsequent quarters. This change, 
in conjunction with legislative approval for a market linked annuity product, led to a fall in 
the market share of life annuities from around 3 per cent to less than 0.2 per cent 
Under Simplified Superannuation, the rules and regulations for the different types of 
retirement income streams were streamlined. Following implementation, all superannuation 
benefits will be tax free (for retirees aged 60 and over) and retirement income streams that 
meet minimum standards will accumulate free of tax. From 20 September 2007, the Age 
Pension means tests will apply equally (and fully) to all types of retirement income 
streams. 
  6The new minimum standards for account-based pensions include the drawdown of a 
minimum amount at least annually, no residual capital value and transfer only upon death.
9 
The minimum drawdown payments are defined as a percentage of the remaining account 
balance and vary by age as summarized in Table 2 below.
10 These rules for account-based 
pensions replace the previous minimum and maximum limits for allocated pensions. 
<insert Table 2 about here> 
In the analysis that follows, we evaluate these new drawdown rules against a number of 
alternatives using criteria to assess simplicity, adequacy, risk, and consumer welfare as 
measured by a utility function. 
3. Evaluating alternative drawdown rules 
Alternative drawdown rules 
We compare the minimum drawdown payouts for account-based pensions under Simplified 
Superannuation against four alternative drawdown rules, including the previous legislated 
minimum payments for allocated pensions and three standard ‘rules of thumb’. In 
summary, the five rules under consideration comprise two statutory rules and three 
formula-based rules
11, as follows:  
•  The minimum drawdown requirements for account-based pensions under Simplified 
Superannuation (referred to from now on as the ‘new legislated minimum’). The 
                                         
9 However, the annual drawdown can be greater than the minimum, the aggregate amounts drawdown each 
year can vary and additional withdrawals can be made at any time. 
10 An exception is ‘transition to retirement’ pensions which are subject to a 10 per cent maximum. 
11 These formula-based payout rules were used in Horneff et al (2007) as the basis for their comparative 
analysis styled on policy and industry experience in the US and Germany. 
  7minimum drawdown varies by age from 4 per cent of the outstanding account balance 
for those aged less than 65 to 14 per cent for retirees aged 95 and over (see Table 2);  
•  The pre-Budget-2006 legislated minimum payments for allocated pensions (referred to 
from now on as the ‘previous legislated minimum’). The minimum (and maximum) 
drawdowns are determined by age-based statutory Pension Valuation Factors - where, 
for example, the minimum payment limit for a 65 year old would be the account 
balance divided by the minimum Pension Valuation Factor for a beneficiary aged 65; 
12  
•  A fixed percentage rule: where a constant fraction of the outstanding account balance is 
withdrawn each period;  
•  A 1/T rule: where the annual withdrawal is determined by T = N – (x+t). That is the 
oldest age in mortality table (N) less the retirees current age (x+t), where x is the age at 
retirement and t is the years since retirement ( t = 1….N-x);  
•  A 1/E(T) rule: where E(T) is life expectancy at the retiree’s current age (age x+t).
13  
A standard metric for comparison of alternative drawdown rules is the benefit/wealth ratio 
(ω). For each year in retirement, t, this is defined as ωτ = BBt/Vt, where Bt
B
                                        
 is the payout at 
time t and Vt is equal to the account balance (prior to payment of the benefit) at time t. For 
the fixed percentage rule we set the drawdown rate equal to the first year payout that the 
retiree would receive if they purchased a single life annuity in the current market using 
their retirement accumulation. We refer to this from now on as the ‘benchmark life annuity’ 
and the annual payment as the ‘benchmark annuity payout’. Using current annuity prices, 
 
12 The minimum and maximum pension valuation factors by age are set out in the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Amendment Regulations. We focus on the minimum drawdown regulations.  
 
13 The life expectancies are computed as 25 year improved survival probabilities from age 10 to age 110 from 
the 2002 Australian Life Tables. 
  8we estimate the benefit/wealth ratio for the ‘benchmark life annuity’ at 6.0 per cent for 
females and 6.1 per cent for males.
14  
Figure 2 illustrates the benefit/wealth ratio paths (over the potential retirement period from 
age 60 to age 108) for each of the five drawdown rules under consideration. The results we 
present here, and from now on, are for a hypothetical female in retirement. As noted in 
Horneff et al (2007) it is appropriate to focus on the case of the female retiree as longevity 
risk is more important for women than for men. 
<insert Figure 2 about here> 
The benefit/wealth ratio paths differ substantially between the alternative drawdown rules. 
The fixed percentage rule, by definition, is a fixed throughout retirement at 6.0 per cent for 
females, while the new legislated minimum rules are almost as simple with seven different 
benefit/wealth ratios over the entire period of potential retirement. By comparison, the 
benefit/wealth ratio for 1/T rule commences at 2 per cent at age 60 and increases every year 
to 100 per cent at the oldest age in the Australian Life Tables, the 1/E(T) rule generates a 
gradual increase in the benefit/wealth ratio from 3.7 per cent to 87 per cent, while the 
drawdowns under the previous legislated minimum increase from 5.8 per cent to 28.6 per 
cent of the account balance.     
Benefit/wealth ratios provide valuable information on the pattern of drawdowns by age and 
the complexity of the different rules (in terms of reasonably constant or continually 
                                         
14 The annuity payouts are the average of current annuity quotes for a single life annuity with no guarantee, 
purchased with a premium of $100,000. These are $6,110 for males and $6,000 for females. As a result, the 
benefit/wealth ratios assumed for the fixed percentage rule translate to 6.1 per cent for males and 6.0 per cent 
for females (see DEXX&R 2007 for the annuity quotes). 
 
  9changing drawdown percentages), However, they provide no indication of the adequacy of 
these drawdowns rules to fund ongoing retirement expenses or of the risk associated with 
the underlying asset allocations. Nor do they assess how a retiree might evaluate the 
drawdown rules after taking account of risk aversion and time preference.  
Portfolio return and volatility 
One of the features of products allowing periodic drawdowns, such as Australia’s previous 
allocated pensions and the new account-based pension products, as compared with standard 
annuity products, is the ability to choose the asset allocation of the portfolios underlying 
the income streams. For example, HESTA, one of Australia’s largest industry 
superannuation funds offers choice of nine investment options for their new account-based 
pension product. These include five portfolios comprising different combinations of 
Australian shares, international shares, property, alternative investments, Australian fixed 
interest, international fixed interest and cash, and four portfolios which include socially 
responsible investments (SRIs) in the asset mix.
15 In order to realistically simulate and 
compare the alternative drawdown rules, we have constructed five ‘representative’ 
investment portfolios for our hypothetical account-based pension products. These are 
designated High Growth, Growth, Balanced, Conservative and Capital Stable and comprise 
different proportions of Australian shares, international shares, Australian property, 
Australian fixed interest and cash. Figure 3 shows the asset allocation pattern for each 
portfolio. The methodology underlying the construction of these portfolios as well as the 
portfolio returns and volatilities is set out in Appendix A. 
                                         
15 See the HESTA website at www.hesta.com.au
 
  10<insert Figure 3 about here> 
We can now combine the drawdown patterns, as illustrated by the benefit/wealth ratios, 
with our representative portfolios to evaluate the alternative drawdown rules. 
Assessment of the alternative drawdown rules for retirement incomes 
We assess the five alternative drawdown rules using the criteria of simplicity, adequacy, 
risk and consumer welfare as measured by a utility function. Initially we assume that the 
underlying assets are held in a balanced portfolio (an assumption we later relax). As well, 
we ignore possible taxes on the earnings of the underlying assets and do not take account of 
interactions with the public Age Pension.
16
Simplicity:  Our gauge of simplicity is a clearly defined schedule of drawdown 
percentages, as indicated by the benefit to wealth ratios discussed earlier and summarized 
in Figure 2. Here the fixed percentage rule dominates (by definition) followed closely by 
the seven-phase minimum drawdown rule introduced as part of the Simplified 
Superannuation reforms. For the other rules evaluated here, the benefit to wealth ratio is 
different for every annual drawdown. 
Adequacy: Our metric for adequacy is ‘expected benefit’. This is defined as the annual 
expected benefit from a particular downdown rule as a proportion of the annual payment 
from the ‘benchmark life annuity’. Figure 4 shows expected benefit paths for each of the 
five drawdown rules, assuming that the individual survives to age 108, and the underlying 
assets are invested in the balanced portfolio plan.  
                                         
16 While all benefits are now tax free, the earnings on the underlying assets are only tax free where the 
minimum standards are met. 
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As shown in Figure 4, there are significant differences in the expected benefit by 
drawdown rule and age. The expected benefit under the fixed percentage rule starts off at 
100 per cent of the benchmark life annuity (by design) and then gradually increases with 
age (as the rate of return on the underlying assets exceeds that on the lifetime annuity). The 
expected benefit under the 1/T rule is the lowest of the five rules at age 60, but continues to 
rise by age, reaching 200 per cent of the benchmark annuity when the retiree is in her mid-
80s, and 500 per cent if she is still alive in her mid-90s. This happens because the rule 
results in small payouts in the early years, leading to higher accumulations to be paid out in 
later years. Finally, the 1/E(T) rule initially provides a lower expected benefit of around 60 
per cent of the benchmark annuity at age 60, which rises to peak at 235 per cent of the 
benchmark annuity at age 85, and then falls rapidly at very old ages if the pensioner is still 
alive.  
Of the statutory rules, the path of expected benefits under the previous legislated minimum 
tracks the 1/E(T) rule quite closely, although it is higher for the first 13 years of retirement 
and peaks at around 160 per cent of the benchmark annuity at age 80 (under our 
assumptions). The Simplified Superannuation legislated minimum generates a path of 
expected benefits below the benchmark annuity (and the fixed percentage rule) for the first 
six years of retirement. Thereafter, the expected benefits increase as a proportion of the 
benchmark annuity as the higher percentage drawdown takes effect, peaking at around 260 
per cent of the benchmark annuity at age 95. Payouts under this rule then fall back to 
around 100 per cent of the benchmark annuity for those still alive after age 100.  
  12The impact of changing the underlying asset allocation from a balanced portfolio to the 
alternatives of high growth, growth, conservative and capital stable, is to change the level 
of expected benefits, but not the rankings of the alternative drawdown rules by age. The 
expected benefit paths for the Simplified Superannuation drawdown rules under the five 
illustrative portfolio allocations are illustrated in Figure 5. Our estimates indicate that the 
expected benefit will be less than the benchmark annuity until the retiree reaches age 65 for 
all of our illustrative portfolios – suggesting that the new legislated minimum drawdown 
for the early years of retirement may be too low.  
The impact of choice of portfolio allocation for retirement income adequacy is clearly 
illustrated by the pattern of expected benefits by age for the alternative portfolio allocations 
illustrated in Figure 5. For example, at age 85, the capital stable portfolio delivers a 
drawdown 60 per cent higher than the benchmark annuity, compared with 97 per cent 
higher for the conservative portfolio, 130 per cent higher under the balanced portfolio, 164 
per cent under the growth portfolio and 172 per cent higher under the high growth 
portfolio. 
<insert Figure 5 about here>     
Risk: As a measure of risk, we construct a metric representing a ‘worst case scenario’ for 
each drawdown rule, given an underlying asset allocation. More precisely our metric is 
defined as the dollar amount of retirement income represented by the first percentile
17 of 
the payout distribution, as generated using the rates of return and standard deviations 
estimated for the illustrative portfolios (see Table A1), as a proportion of the annual 
                                         
17 We assume that portfolio returns are log-normally distributed in choosing the 1% quantile. 
  13payment from the ‘benchmark life annuity’.
18 Figure 6 illustrates this worst case scenario 
for each of the five drawdown rules under consideration where the retirement accumulation 
is invested in a balanced portfolio. With the exception of the 1/E(T) rule, where the 
minimum benefit reaches the benchmark annuity by age 77, all of the worst case scenarios 
are below the benchmark annuity payouts until retirees reach their mid-80s. 
<insert Figure 6 about here> 
In the early years of retirement (for retirees in their 60s) the probable minimum benefits are 
quite similar under both the previous legislated minimum and the fixed percentage rule, but 
are lower for both the 1/E(T) rule and the new rules under Simplified Superannuation. 
Under the fixed percentage rule and the previous legislated minimum rule, the probable 
minimum benefit is less than the benchmark annuity payout for the entire potential period 
of retirement (from age 60 to age 108 in our analysis). 
On the other hand, the probable minimum payments under the 1/T rule start at very low 
levels (of less than 50 per cent of the benchmark annuity payout) in the early years of 
retirement but increase rapidly in later retirement to over 300 per cent of the benchmark 
annuity for those who live into their 90s. Where the retirement accumulation is invested in 
a balanced portfolio, the Simplified Superannuation rules result in a minimum benefit well 
in excess of the benchmark annuity for retirees who live past their mid 80s.    
                                         
18 It is noted, however, that if the retiree were still alive, she would receive an annual drawdown of at least 
this minimum payout with a probability of 99 per cent. 
 
  14As with expected benefits, the impact of altering the underlying portfolio allocation, is to 
change the level of the minimum benefit, but not the rankings by age of the alternative 
drawdown rules. The minimum benefit paths under Simplified Superannuation for the five 
alternative portfolio allocations are illustrated in Figure 7. The minimum expected benefit 
under all five portfolio allocations (except capital stable) is less than the benchmark annuity 
until retirees reach age 80. As would be expected, for those portfolios with a very high 
proportion of equities such as the high growth portfolio (with 50 per cent domestic equities 
and 30 per cent international equities), the minimum benefit does not exceed the 
benchmark annuity at any age.    
<insert Figure 7 about here>     
Consumer welfare: Finally, to take account of risk aversion and the time preference of the 
retirees, we evaluate the five drawdown rules using a utility framework.  
Following the approach taken in Horneff et al (2007) we adopt CRRA preferences with 
uncertainty over survival and assume that the retiree’s objective function U is defined over 
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where β  is the time preference of the investor which is set to 0.96 (following previous 
analysis - Horneff et al 2007, Blake et al 2003), k is the strength of the bequest motive 
  15(ranging from 0 to 1),  x t p +  is the probability that a female of age x+t  survives one more 
year 
19 and the individual’s coefficient of relative risk aversion is represented by γ, which 
ranges from 0.5 to 8 in this analysis.
20 As indicated earlier, the nominal benefit from a 
drawdown plan in period t is given by  t B  and the value of assets remaining in the account 
is  .  t V
As with our earlier analysis we initially assume that the assets underlying the retirement 
income stream are invested in a balanced portfolio. To compare the utility of different 
rules, we calculate the expected lifetime utility (using equation 1) for each of the five 
alternative drawdown rules, for levels of risk aversion ranging from 0.5 to 8. Initially we 
assume no bequests, so the bequest weight, k, is set at 0. We then translate each utility level 
into an equivalent annuity income stream for life and express this as a proportion of the 
‘benchmark annuity’. The annuity equivalent income stream can be interpreted as the 
constant nominal lifetime income stream that would provide the same level of utility to the 
retiree as the drawdown in question. We also compute the optimal path of drawdown using 
dynamic programming for each level of risk aversion to provide a point of comparison with 
arbitrarily chosen paths.
 21
Differences in welfare derived from a particular drawdown path are illustrated in Figure 8. 
For each of the five withdrawal rules (and the optimal path), we graph the annuity 
                                         
19 As noted earlier, the life expectancies are computed as the 25 year improved survival probabilities from age 
10 to 110 from the 2002 Australian Life Tables. 
20 As indicated in Horneff et al 2007, γ below 1 represents low risk aversion, γ of between 1 and 5 represents 
moderate risk aversion, while γ above 5 represents high risk aversion. 
21 See Horneff et al 2007 for a detailed description of the dynamic programming problem. Solutions 
presented here are derived numerically using optimization routines in Matlab.  
  16equivalent income stream as a proportion of the benchmark annuity stream, for levels of 
risk aversion from 0.5 to 8.    
 
<insert Figure 8 about here> 
 
The results show the importance of risk aversion in determining the preferred drawdown 
rule.
22 After the optimal paths, which are most preferred for any level of risk aversion by 
construction, the 1/E(T) rule and the previous legislated minimum are most preferred for 
females with low levels of risk aversion, but least preferred for females with medium to 
high levels of risk aversion, while the 1/T rule is least preferred for females with low levels 
of risk aversion and then ranks mid range as levels of risk aversion increase. The fixed 
percentage rule dominates all other strategies for female retirees with medium and high 
levels of risk aversion.
23 The new rules for account-based pensions under Simplified 
Superannuation, rank mid range across the spectrum of risk tolerance, while the previous 
legislated minimum drawdown for allocated pensions ranks poorly, except for females with 
very low levels of risk aversion. 
So far we have assumed that the underlying assets are held in a balanced portfolio. The 
impact of the alternative portfolio allocations on consumer preferences is to change the size 
of the certainty equivalent annuity estimates (as a proportion of the benchmark annuity), 
but not the rankings by risk tolerance of the alternative drawdown rules. As would be 
expected, the path of certainty equivalent annuity estimates become flatter as one changes 
                                         
22 As has been shown in previous studies (Brown 2001, Horneff et al 2007). 
23 Similar results were found for male retirees. 
  17the underlying asset allocation from high growth, to growth, to balanced, conservative, and 
then capital stable.  Further, the results do not change significantly if we relax the 
assumption of no bequests.  
4. Discussion and concluding comments   
We have assessed five alternative drawdown rules in terms of simplicity, adequacy, risk 
and consumer preferences. A key finding is that the different drawdown rules perform 
differently under each of the criteria for assessment, for retirees at different ages and for 
different levels of risk aversion. Further, as one would expect, modifying the underlying 
asset allocation changes the drawdown amounts, but not the ranking of the alternative 
drawdown rules under each of the assessment criteria.  
In summary: 
•  The benefit/wealth ratios provide some indication of simplicity – where simplicity is 
defined as clearly identified drawdown percentages. The fixed percentage rule ranks 
first (by assumption) closely followed by the new legislated minimum rules. 
•  Under the metric for expected benefit - expected drawdown as a percentage of the 
‘benchmark annuity payment’ – the previous legislated minimum for allocated pensions 
performs well for younger retirees, the 1/T rule does well for older retirees, while the 
fixed percentage rule and the new Simplified Superannuation rules for account-based 
pensions do quite well for retirees of all ages.  
•  Similarly, under the metric for risk - the minimum expected benefit defined as the 
dollar amount of retirement income represented by the first percentile of the payout 
distribution as a proportion of the ‘benchmark annuity payment’ - the previous 
  18legislated minimum rules for allocated pensions perform best for younger retirees, the 
1/T does best for older retirees, and the Simplified Superannuation rules have 
reasonably high minimum benefits for all ages. However, where the accumulation is 
invested in a balanced portfolio the probable minimum benefit under the fixed 
percentage rule, is below the benchmark annuity over the entire period of retirement.  
•  The analysis of consumer welfare indicates that the fixed percentage rule dominates the 
new legislated minimum drawdowns for account-based pensions at high levels of risk 
aversion while the 1/E(T) is preferred for females with a low level of risk aversion. The 
optimal path is (by construction) preferred to all rules for any level of risk aversion, 
with the fixed percentage rule preferred next for all except those with low levels of risk 
aversion. 
Overall, the new legislated minimum drawdown rules for account-based pensions under 
Simplified Superannuation perform reasonably well under all criteria, and offer a 
substantial improvement over the previous allocated pension minimum drawdown limits. 
However, the fixed percentage rule also performs well under all criteria and is preferred to 
the illustrative drawdown rules we consider for all except retirees with high tolerance to 
risk. This conclusion was also reached in Horneff et al (2007) in a similar analysis 
motivated by US and German pensions. 
So far we have treated the minimum drawdown regulations as if they were fixed. We note, 
however, that the new minimum drawdown rules are not upper bounds on withdrawals, and 
retirees are free to make drawdowns of more than the minimum if they wish. In this context 
we investigate the case where the fixed percentage or optimal drawdown rules are 
  19followed, except where they breach the new rules – in which case the new legislated 
minimum rules apply.  
We focus on the optimal path and the fixed percentage rule – as the most preferred 
drawdown patterns. We compare the certainty equivalent annuity (as a proportion of the 
benchmark annuity) for the so-called ‘unconstrained’ drawdowns (as discussed above and 
set out in Figure 8), with the certainty equivalent annuity proportions where the drawdowns 
are ‘constrained’ by new rules.  
Our results, summarized in Figure 9, show that utility improves slightly across all levels of 
risk aversion where the drawdown patterns of the fixed percentage rule are constrained by 
the new seven-phase drawdown rules. However, a retiree following an optimal path is 
made slightly worse off by having to abide by the minimum drawdown at higher levels of 
risk aversion. The reason for the improvements in welfare when the fixed percentage rule is 
constrained by the new minimum regulations is that the retiree is compelled to consume at 
a faster rate towards the end of life by the regulations, a pattern which mimics more closely 
the optimal path. Similarly, the fixed percentage rule increases consumption in early 
retirement compared with the new legislated minimum rules, again aligning closer to the 
optimal path. The combination of both rules improves welfare for most consumers. Slightly 
lower utility attaches to the constrained optimal path compared with the unconstrained path 
because the new legislated minimum rules compel very risk-averse retirees to consume 
slightly faster than they would like at older ages.  
<insert Figure 9 about here>    
  20An outcome of this analysis is that we can ‘back-out’ the drawdown patterns implied by the 
‘constrained’ paths. In Figure 10 we compare the implied drawdown patterns under the 
‘constrained’ optimal path for three illustrative levels of risk aversion – set at relative risk 
aversion of 2, 5 and 7 - with the implied drawdown pattern under the ‘constrained’ fixed 
percentage rule and the new seven-phase drawdown rule for account-based pensions under 
Simplified Superannuation. As with our earlier analysis we assume that the underlying 
assets are invested in a balanced portfolio and there are no bequests.    
<insert Figure 10 about here> 
The comparison indicates that the implied drawdowns under the ‘constrained’ optimal path 
are reasonably insensitive to levels of risk aversion for younger retirees, but that risk averse 
older retirees drawdown at slower rate than their more risk tolerant counterparts and a close 
examination of the graph shows that the regulatory minimum constraint is binding for the 
more risk averse from ages in the mid-80s to the late 90s. 
A feature of all three of the illustrative implied optimal drawdown rules, is that the 
drawdown pattern is different in every period. These can be compared with the seven-phase 
drawdown pattern under the new legislated minimum drawdown rules for account-based 
pensions, and the implied drawdown pattern under the constrained fixed percentage rules 
which compress into a five-phase rule. The implied drawdowns under the optimal rules at 
specific ages are compared with the constrained fixed percentage and Simplified 
Superannuation rules in Table 3.  
<insert Table 3 about here> 
  21We note the simplicity of the implied drawdown pattern for the constrained fixed 
percentage rule.  
In sum, our analysis indicates that the new legislated minimum drawdown rules for 
account-based pensions are not only a significant improvement on the previous drawdown 
limits for allocated pensions, but perform well against a range of alternative rules. 
However, we find that welfare can be improved for all retirees where the current seven-
phase drawdown rule is further simplified to a five-phase rule, under which retirees are 
required to drawdown at a faster rate during their earlier years of retirement – as indicated 
by the ‘constrained fixed percentage’ column in Table 3.  
So far we have ignored taxes and the interaction of the drawdowns with the public Age 
Pension. While superannuation benefits are tax free (for retirees age 60 and above), the 
earnings on the underlying assets are only free of tax where the legislated minimum 
drawdown requirements are met. In circumstances where the legislated minimum 
drawdown rules are not met, the effective tax rate applying to the earnings of the 
underlying assets will then depend upon the particular portfolio allocation (due to the 
working of the imputation system). As well, although the Age Pension means tests now 
apply equally to all retirement income streams, the availability of a public Age Pension 
(which has the features of an indexed life annuity) would influence the estimates of utility.   
Overall, our analysis suggests that welfare could be further improved with even more 
simplification of Simplified Superannuation. Future research will explore whether these 
results still hold when account is taken of taxes and public Age Pension interactions.       
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  25Appendix A: Methodology for construction of investment portfolios 
Using monthly observations on asset class returns indices (30 December 1989 -- 30 
December 2005), we calculate monthly periodic returns and then take a weighted average 
to make the periodic portfolio return. The net of fees portfolio return is then 
,, ln(1 ) ln(1 ) Pt Pt Pt ri =+−+ , f  
Where   is the periodic nominal portfolio return and  , Pt i , Pt f  is the percentage rate of 





































where N is the number of observations in the sample. Table A1 sets out the annualized net-
of-fees returns and standard deviations for each investment strategy.  
Table A1: Portfolio returns and volatilities  






High Growth  10.4%  8.50%  9.88% 
Growth  10.0%  8.20%  7.90% 
Balanced  9.2%  7.50%  5.82% 
Conservative  8.5%  6.80%  3.80% 
Capital Stable  7.5%  5.90%  1.50% 
Notes: This table presents estimates of nominal returns and standard deviation values for five representative 
investment portfolios. Returns are the annualised log change in the weighted sum of monthly periodic returns 
to the component asset classes, less a deduction for management fees. (Weights for each portfolio are given in 
Figure 1.) We compute monthly gross returns to each asset class index where Australian equities are the 
Australia-DS Market index, International equities are the AC WORLD INDEX ex AUSTRALIA translated 
into Australian dollars at the end-month AUD/USD exchange rate, fixed income is the UBS Composite All 
Maturities index for Australia, property is the S&P/ASX 300 Property index and cash is the UBS AU Bank 
Bills All Maturities index, all from Datastream. The total return price index (RI) of the relevant asset class 
index was used for calculations of the periodic monthly returns. Sample data runs monthly from December 
1989 – December 2005 
  26The sample period from which these returns are calculated includes a long period of strong 
performance in the domestic equity and property markets, which may slightly favour self-
insurance over annuitisation in our analysis since annuity payouts are dependent on returns 
from fixed interest securities. Notwithstanding some possible overstatement of investment 
returns, if we condition on a specific allocation, comparisons between alternative draw-
down paths and the regulated minimum are valid. 
 
  27Table 1: Taxation and Age Pension means test treatment of retirement 
income streams from a taxed fund  
 
  Income streams purchased pre 2007  Income streams purchased post 2007 
Product type  Taxation  Means tests  Taxation  Means tests 
Life pension or annuity 
Life expectancy pension 
or annuity 
Term allocated pension 
(TAP) 
Taxable income 




underlying assets tax 
exempt 






for return of capital 
 








underlying assets tax 
exempt 




for return of capital 
 
 




































Deemed income for 
account-based income 
streams 
Income adjusted for 




Source: Bateman and Kingston (2007). 
 
a.  Annual deductible amount = undeducted purchase price (UPP)/life expectancy (or term). 
b.  Asset test taper: $3 per fortnight for every $1,000 of assets above assets test free area. 
c.  100% assets test exemption if purchased before 20 September 2004. 
d.  Earnings on underlying assets taxed at 15 per cent for pensions which do not satisfy the ‘minimum 
standards’.  
e.  Assets test taper halved to $1.50 per fortnight for every $1,000 of assets above assets free area. Applies to 
assets purchased on or after 20 September 2007 
  28. 
Table 2: Minimum drawdown by age under Simplified Superannuation 
Age  per cent of account balance






95 and over  14 
 
Source: Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Amendment Regulations 2007 (No.1), Schedule 3. 
 
 
  29Table 3: Actual and implied drawdown rules 






(rra = 2) 
Constrained 
optimal 
(rra = 5) 
Constrained 
optimal 
(rra = 7) 
Age  (per cent of account balance) 


















80-84 7  7  10.0 
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This figure presents the compositions of representative investment portfolios. Each investment is a 
combination of two or more asset classes including Australian shares, international shares, Australian 
property securities, Australian fixed interest and cash. 
 
  33Figure 4: Expected benefit as a proportion of the benchmark annuity 













































Figure 5: Expected benefit from Simplified Superannuation as a proportion 
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  34Figure 6: Probable minimum benefit as a proportion of benchmark annuity 
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Figure 7: Probable minimum benefit from Simplified Superannuation as a 
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